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Abstract 
Fund managers have been found to herd significantly in major international markets, with evidence suggesting that 
style investing reinforces their herding. However, research to date has not explored the herding-style relationship in 
highly concentrated markets, despite the impact that market concentration can confer over this relationship. This study 
investigates this issue in the context of Portugal using monthly funds’ portfolio-holdings and documents evidence 
suggesting the significant temporal dependence of monthly institutional demand which is for the most part due to 
herding. The significance of this dependence remains robust when controlling for several styles, as well as accounting 
for the entry of Portugal into the EURONEXT and the outbreak of the ongoing global crisis. Combining the above with 
the limited evidence of significance in the presence of the styles controlled for, the authors conclude that Portuguese 
fund managers herd significantly without style affecting their herding. 
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Introduction 
Style investing constitutes a form of characteristic 
trading according to which, investors base their 
stock selection on specific characteristics, such as 
for example a stock’s past returns or its market 
capitalization. For investors following a specific 
style, the expectation is that their trades will be 
correlated as they will be conditioned upon the same 
stock-characteristic, thus suggesting that style 
investing contributes to herding in capital markets. 
Evidence on this has been particularly strong as 
regards institutional investors, who are found to 
exhibit significant herding as well as style investing 
in their trades (e.g. Sias, 2004; Choi and Sias, 2009).  
It is important to note that the impact of style investing 
over institutional herding has been investigated on the 
premises of large markets (mainly the US, as well as a 
few large Asian and European ones) with small, highly 
concentrated markets having remained largely outside 
the scope of this investigation. We believe that this 
allows for a gap in the literature, since high 
concentration produces trading dynamics that can 
affect the relationship between style investing and 
institutional herding. On the one hand, highly 
concentrated environments facilitate institutional 
herding through the greater ease of peer-monitoring 
and information-sharing, since in these environments 
fund managers are more likely to know each other and 
less likely to deviate from their industry’s norm in 
order to avoid being stigmatized as deviants (Do et al., 
2008). On the other hand, concentrated market 
structures render style investing harder to apply, as 
they allow for less feasible investment options 
compared to larger markets.  
                                                     
 Konstantinos Gavriilidis, Vasileios Kallinterakis, Mario Pedro Leire-
Ferreira, 2013. 
The above suggests that style investing is expected 
to be of limited significance in highly concentrated 
markets, contributing little to their institutional 
herding and our paper tests the validity of this 
empirically for the first time in the context of such a 
market, namely Portugal, where both the stock 
exchange and the funds’ industry bear a particularly 
high level of concentration. The remainder of the 
paper is organized as follows. Section 1 outlines the 
data and methodology employed alongside some 
descriptive statistics. Section 2 presents and discusses 
the results while the final section concludes. 
1. Data and methodology 
The present study is based upon monthly portfolio 
reports of Portuguese equity funds obtained from 
the Portuguese Securities Markets Commission 
(Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários í 
CMVM). Our sample includes a total of 65 funds 
and covers the period between July 1996 and June 
2011. The data in the reports provide us with 
information as per the code and the name of each fund, 
its designation, the code and the name of the assets 
held in each fund’s portfolio, the number of shares of 
each stock held by each fund at the end of each month 
and the value of each fund’s position in each stock at 
the end of each month. Table 1 (see Appendix) 
provides us with descriptive statistics of our data, 
where it is shown (Panel A) that the total number of 
stocks our sample funds have invested in during our 
sample period is 99. Panel B shows that the average 
number of active stocks per month traded by at least 
one fund is 37.8 for the whole period, while the 
average number of active funds per stock per month is 
7.7 (Panel C). These figures are clearly indicative of a 
small market of rather high concentration where 
herding is obviously facilitated (with about eight funds 
being active on average in each stock each month, this 
suggests that each fund manager has, on average, 
seven of his peers to monitor). 
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To empirically investigate the style-herding relation-
ship we utilize the Sias (2004) measure, whose 
aim is to assess the temporal dependence of institu- 
 
tional demand. The latter is defined here as the 
raw fraction of funds buying security k during 
month t (Rawǻk,t): 
.1, tmonthduringksecurityinactivefundsofnumberTotal
tmonthduringksecuritybuyingfundsofNumberRaw tk  '       (1) 
A fund is identified as a “buyer” (“seller”) during 
month t if it has increased (decreased) its position in 
that security in month t compared to the previous 
month. Rawǻk,t is then standardized by subtracting in 
each month from each security’s Raw¨k,t its cross-
sectional (across all active stocks in that month) 
average and divide by its cross-sectional standard 
deviation as follows: 
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The temporal dependence of institutional demand is 
assessed by assuming that ǻk,t follows a first-order 
autoregressive process: 
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Both sides of (3) are standardized and equation bears 
only one explanatory variable; consequently, the slope 
(Ⱦt) represents institutional demand’s cross-sectional 
correlation between months t and t-1. To identify 
whether this correlation is due to funds following their 
own past trades or funds following their peers 
(herding), Sias (2004) decomposes Ⱦt into two parts: 
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where1Nk,t is the total number of funds active in 
stock k in month t, Dn,k,t is a dummy variable equal 
to one (zero) if fund n is a buyer (seller) of stock k 
in month t, Raw¨k,t is the raw fraction of funds 
buying stock k in month t, ı(Raw¨k,t) is its cross 
sectional standard deviation across all active 
securities in month t and tRaw'  is the cross-
sectional average of Raw¨k,t in month t. Equation (4) 
consists of two additive components, the former 
reflective of “funds following their own trades” and 
the latter representing “funds following other funds” 
(herding). A positive (negative) value for the first 
component indicates that funds in month t follow 
(reverse) their trades of month t-1. A positive 
(negative) value for the second component indicates 
that funds in month t follow (assume opposite 
positions to) other funds’ trades of month t-1. 
Since the purpose of our work is to gauge the impact 
of style over herding (which is extracted through the 
decomposition of Ⱦt), we augment equation (3) as 
follows: 
,
,1,1,, tktkttkttk X HJE ' ' 
 
    (5) 
where Xk,t-1 represents the measure of a particular 
style and its inclusion allows us to assess whether 
controlling for style bears an effect over the 
                                                     
1
 The total number of funds active in a stock is the sum of those funds 
that have increased their position in that stock (buyers) and those funds 
that have decreased their position in that stock (sellers). 
significance of Ⱦt í and indirectly, herding. To 
proxy for style, we employ a series of style-
indicators (analysts’ recommendations; momentum; 
size; value/growth; volatility; and volume).  
(a) Analysts’ recommendations: researchers have 
recently exhibited a surge in their interest regarding 
the link between analysts’ recommendations and 
mutual fund managers and how the former affect the 
decision making process of the latter. Evidence 
suggests that institutional investors are affected by 
the recommendations of market analysts (Chen and 
Cheng, 2005; Busse et al., 2008). Investment 
professionals that have an informational disadvantage 
relative to their peers will often be more prone 
towards following financial analysts in their attempt 
to infer information from them; this could be the 
case due to the fact that the majority of investment 
firms do not have in-house analysts as it is usually 
the case in the very large investment firms. 
Nevertheless, even large fund management houses 
which have their own research departments and 
analysts tend to pay attention to other analysts’ 
forecasts as well. As O’Brien and Bhushan (1990) 
and Brown et al. (2009) suggest, this is due to the 
fact that fund managers are obliged to apply the 
“prudent man rule”, namely act in their clients’ best 
interest; thus paying attention to other analysts’ 
recommendations, and not only those of their in-
house analysts, is often viewed by fund managers as 
evidence of good and ethical practice. To measure 
analyst recommendations we use the consensus 
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analysts’ recommendations reported monthly by 
Thomson DataStream (which uses a 1-5 scale and 
provides the following classifications: 1-1.49 = 
“strong buy”; 1.5-2.49 = “buy”; 2.5-3.49 = “hold”; 
3.5-4.49 = “underperform”; 4.5-5 = “sell”) for all 99 
Portuguese stocks held by our funds at any point 
during our sample period.  
(b) Momentum: momentum strategies involve 
buying stocks that have performed well in the recent 
past and selling stocks that have performed poorly. 
In the seminal paper on momentum strategies, 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) found significantly 
higher returns for the portfolios comprised of 
winner stocks in contrast to the ones comprised of 
loser stocks, thus providing the first evidence on 
momentum profitability for the 1965-1989 period in 
the US market. Their study was later followed by a 
series of other works (see e.g. Rouwenhorst, 1998; 
Forner and Marhuenda, 2003; Galariotis et al., 
2007) confirming the profitability of momentum 
trading worldwide. A wealth of research has 
indicated that fund managers are prone to pursuing 
momentum strategies. This has been particularly the 
case with evidence from the US (Lakonishok et al., 
1992; Grinblatt et al., 1995; Brennan and Cao, 1997; 
Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Wermers, 1999) as well 
as other markets including Germany (Walter and 
Weber, 2006), Poland (Voronkova and Bohl, 2005) 
and South Korea (Choe et al., 1999). 
To measure momentum we use the month-end 
closing prices1 for all 99 Portuguese stocks held by 
our funds at any point during our sample period and 
calculate their monthly log-differenced returns2.  
(c) Size: perhaps the most common investment style 
encountered in the market is that based upon the 
categorization of stocks according to their size. In 
fact, there is a plethora of mutual funds characterized 
as “Small-cap” or “Large-cap” reflecting their focus 
on investing towards small sized or large sized firms 
respectively. The importance of firms’ size and its 
impact upon stock prices was initially raised by Banz 
(1981) who found that smaller firms tended to exhibit 
higher returns than those predicted by the CAPM, 
outperforming larger firms in the NYSE market during 
the 1926-1975 period. This phenomenon, coined as the 
“size effect” and identified as a market anomaly, has 
been empirically supported by numerous studies in the 
literature (see e.g. Reinganum, 1981; Keim, 1983), 
while a vast amount of research (see e.g. Brown and 
Goetzmann, 1997; Chan et al., 2002) confirms the 
presence of size as a style used by mutual funds.  
                                                     
1
 Source: Thomson DataStream. 
2
 The monthly log-differenced return for each stock is given by the 
difference of the natural logarithms of prices at the end of months t and 
t-1, respectively. 
To measure size we use the month-end market 
capitalization values3 for all 99 Portuguese stocks held 
by our funds at any point during our sample period.  
(d) Value-growth: a common categorization of 
investment funds is according to whether the stocks 
they invest in are value or growth stocks. The term 
“value” is used to refer to those stocks with low P/E 
ratios and high dividend yield (Lakonishok et al., 
1994); in other words these are the stocks that trade 
below their intrinsic value. On the other hand, 
“growth” stocks are those with high P/E ratios and 
low dividend yield and represent companies with 
high earnings’ growth rate (Lakonishok et al., 
1994). There is overwhelming evidence suggesting 
that a strategy investing in value stocks produces 
returns in excess of those obtained by a strategy 
investing in growth stocks. Among the first 
researches in this vein was that of Basu (1977) who 
documented the relationship between the P/E ratio 
and expected returns. Using monthly data for over 
1400 NYSE firms for the period of 1956-1971, he 
examined whether stocks with low P/E ratios had 
significantly higher returns than those with high 
P/E ratios. After constructing portfolios of high and 
low P/E stocks, his empirical results reported 
significantly higher returns for the low P/E 
portfolios. These seminal findings by Basu (1977) 
were later confirmed in a series of studies across 
international markets (Chan et al., 1991). Although 
Fama and French (1992) attributed the documented 
superior performance of value strategies to the 
higher underlying risk of value stocks, a series of 
studies (Lakonishok et al., 1994; Porta et al., 1997) 
have indicated that its roots need to be traced to 
behavioral explanations4.  
To proxy for value/growth trading we use the 
month-end price-earnings (P/E) values5 for all 99 
Portuguese stocks held by our funds at any point 
during our sample period.  
(e) Volatility: the role of volatility as a style 
indicator hinges upon the link of volatility to risk 
and information. High-volatility stocks can constitute 
rather tempting investment options for rational 
                                                     
3
 Source: Thomson DataStream. 
4
 Lakonishok et al (1994) argued that the higher returns achieved by 
value strategies are due to the fact that they are actually bucking the 
trend-chasing strategies of noise traders. The latter tend to pay too much 
attention to recent earnings’ growth and tend to overreact to good or bad 
news. As a result they tend to overprice the growth (“glamour”) stocks 
and since they overreact to companies that have performed poorly in the 
recent past, these companies become underpriced. As such, investors 
who follow value strategies and invest in undervalued companies will 
eventually earn higher returns than those investing in growth stocks. 
Porta et al (1997) suggested that investors often make errors in their 
expectations about the future earnings of glamour stocks; thus when the 
earnings are actually announced, value stocks í whose expectations 
were lower - outperform glamour stocks. 
5
 Source: Thomson DataStream. 
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investors, since high volatility is linked to enhanced 
information flow (Ross, 1989) the latter translated 
through higher volumes and reduced liquidity risk. 
Another possibility is that funds target high-
volatility stocks in order to enjoy higher returns, if one 
assumes high volatility to be a proxy of increased risk. 
To proxy for volatility we use Schwert’s (1989) 
approach which calculates volatility as the monthly 
standard deviation of daily log-differenced returns for 
each of the 99 stocks held by our funds at any point 
during our sample period.  
(f) Volume: high-volume stocks allow investors 
easier entry into (exit from) a position and are thus 
associated, as mentioned above, with less liquidity 
risk. High volume is further associated with high 
visibility (Gervais et al., 2001) and attention-
grabbing (Barber et al., 2009), thus reducing the 
perceived uncertainty regarding a stock (more 
investors follow it, so it enjoys more coverage) and 
facilitating the stock-picking process1. High volume 
has also been found to be a useful input in trading. 
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) showed that it 
affected the profitability of momentum strategies, 
with momentum profits (calculated in line with 
Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) being higher for high-
volume stocks in the US. Additionally, Gervais et 
al. (2001) examined the existence of the “high 
volume premium” on the premises of the NYSE for 
the 1963-1996 period with their findings revealing 
that high volume stocks traded at a premium in the 
short-run (i.e. exhibiting higher returns compared to 
low volume stocks). To proxy for volume we use 
the monthly volume (generated by aggregating all 
daily volume observations2 within a month) for each 
of the 99 stocks held by our funds at any point 
during our sample period.  
The above estimations from equation (3) and (5) 
cover a rather long window during which Portugal 
underwent major regulatory changes, the most 
notable of which was its merger into the 
EURONEXT-group. To gauge the impact of this 
event over our estimations, we split the sample 
period into two sub-periods using September 2002 
(when Portugal’s merger into EURONEXT was 
finalized) as the cut-off point and re-estimate 
equations (3) and (5) for the pre- (July 1996-August 
2002) and post-EURONEXT (September 2002-June 
2011) periods. What is more, in view of the ongoing 
credit crisis, we re-estimate equations (3) and (5) for 
                                                     
1
 The decision to buy a stock is rather different in terms of complexity 
to the decision of selling one. While the decision to sell a stock involves 
choosing among the stocks one already owns, the decision to buy 
involves choosing among the universe of listed stocks. High volume 
helps alleviate this issue since it can increase the visibility of a stock, 
grabbing investors’ attention and increasing the chances of them 
considering its purchase.   
2
 Source: Thomson DataStream. 
the post-EURONEXT (September 2002-June 2011) 
period splitting the latter into a pre- (September 
2002-December 2007) and a post- (January 2008-
June 2011) period in order the assess the effect of 
the crisis over our estimations.  
2. Results discussion 
To begin with, Portuguese institutional demand 
exhibits a notably significant (1 percent level) 
temporal dependence of high magnitude, as 
reflected through the monthly cross-sectional 
correlation of institutional demand whose values 
hover steadily within a 31-36% band for all test 
results in Tables 2-8 (see Appendix).  
This temporal dependence is mostly the result of 
funds’ herding and appears robust when accounting 
for a series of styles. As one might expect for a 
highly concentrated market, evidence in favor of 
significant style investing appears limited, since of 
the six style-indicators employed here, three (analysts’ 
recommendations; price-earnings; volatility) exhibit no 
sign of significance in our estimations. It does appear, 
however, that Portuguese funds engage significantly in 
contrarian trading, while they also prefer stocks of 
relatively lower volume and capitalization.  
We now turn to control for the robustness of our 
results to the partitioning of our sample period on 
the premises of Portugal’s merger into 
EURONEXT. Table 9 (see Appendix) presents the 
estimates from equation (3) where the significance 
(1 percent level) of Ⱦt is confirmed both before (July 
1996-August 2002) and after (September 2002-June 
2011) the market’s entry into EURONEXT. The 
values of Ⱦt post-EURONEXT appear higher 
compared to pre-EURONEXT, yet there is little 
evidence3 suggesting a significance in their difference. 
The observed significant temporal dependence of 
institutional demand is again (as in Table 2) mostly 
the product of herding: the “funds following others’ 
trades” part bears values always larger compared to 
the “funds following their own trades” part. The 
“funds following their own trades” component 
increases in value post-EURONEXT, with the pre- 
versus post-EURONEXT difference being significant 
at the 5 percent level in all cases. Conversely, the 
“funds following others’ trades” component mostly 
decreases post-EURONEXT4, with the difference 
pre- versus post-EURONEXT being almost overtly 
insignificant5. 
                                                     
3
 Our Wald-tests’ statistics indicate that this difference is significant for 
the full sample of our stocks (5 percent level) and assuming stocks 
traded by at least 3 funds (10 percent level). 
4
 With the exception of the test assuming the full sample of stocks.  
5
 With the marginal exception of the test assuming stocks traded by at 
least 5 funds.  
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Table 10 (see Appendix) presents the results from 
equation (5) before and after Portugal’s entry into 
the EURONEXT platform to control for the impact 
of analysts’ recommendations as a style over our 
findings. As the table indicates, Ⱦt maintains its 
significance (1 percent level) in all cases without its 
values assuming a uniform direction pre- versus 
post-EURONEXT1 and with the pre-/post-
EURONEXT difference in its values appearing 
significant only when assuming stocks traded by at 
least 3 funds. Much like in Table 3, the coefficient 
of consensus analysts’ recommendations remains 
insignificant2, thus again suggesting that it does not 
constitute a style-indicator significantly followed by 
Portuguese fund managers.  
Table 11 (see Appendix) contains the results pre- 
versus post-EURONEXT when accounting for the 
impact of momentum strategies. Here Ⱦt is 
overwhelmingly significant (1 percent level) with 
its post-EURONEXT values always exceeding the 
pre-EURONEXT ones; its pre- versus post-
EURONEXT difference is significant for the full 
sample of stocks and when assuming stocks traded 
by at least three funds. The lagged stock returns’ 
coefficient is always insignificant pre-EURONEXT; 
its significance grows post-EURONEXT where it 
appears significantly3 negative. Consequently, the 
previously documented significance of the contrarian 
tendencies of Portuguese fund managers in Table 4 
for the full-sample period appears to be related to 
the market’s entry into EURONEXT. 
Table 12 (see Appendix) presents the results from 
equation (5) before and after Portugal’s entry into 
EURONEXT. As the table shows, Ⱦt is always 
significant (1 percent level) and grows larger in 
magnitude post-EURONEXT. The difference pre- 
versus post-EURONEXT appears significant for the 
full sample of our stocks (5 percent level) and 
assuming stocks traded by at least 2 (10 percent 
level) and 3 funds (5 percent level). It is further 
interesting to note that the lagged size-coefficient 
appears significant (5 percent level) only post-
EURONEXT, with no trace of its significance being 
detected in the pre-EURONEXT period. The sign of 
the lagged size-coefficient is consistently negative 
in all cases (with the exception of the test assuming 
stocks traded by at least five funds pre-EURONEXT), 
thus suggesting that the aforementioned size-effect 
                                                     
1
 The values of ȕt grow post-EURONEXT for the full sample of stocks 
and assuming stocks traded by at least 2 and 3 funds, while they drop 
post-EURONEXT assuming stocks traded by at least 4 and 5 funds. 
2
 The only exception here is the pre-EURONEXT test assuming stocks 
traded by at least 5 funds, where the analysts’ recommendation 
coefficient is found to be significant at the 10 percent level.  
3
 With the exception of the test when assuming stocks traded by at least 
5 funds. 
reported in Table 5 for the full-sample period is 
related to the market’s merger into EURONEXT. 
Table 13 (see Appendix) outlines the estimates 
obtained from running equation (5) pre- and post-
EURONEXT; again here, the significance of Ⱦt 
persists (1 percent level). Its values post-EURONEXT 
are higher compared to pre-EURONEXT with this 
difference appearing significant for all tests. The 
lagged P/E coefficient exhibits no sign of 
significance be it pre- or post-EURONEXT, in line 
with the results in Table 6, thus confirming that 
Portuguese funds do not engage in significant 
value/growth trading. 
Table 14 (see Appendix) again illustrates that Ⱦt 
remains significant (1 percent level) prior to and 
after the entry of Portugal into EURONEXT when 
controlling for volatility as a style, with its values 
again appearing higher post-EURONEXT4. The 
lagged volatility coefficient is significant in only two 
tests (assuming stocks traded by at least 2 and 3 funds) 
pre-EURONEXT, with these two tests being the only 
ones where the pre-/post-EURONEXT difference in 
volatility appears significant (5 percent level). 
Finally, Table 15 (see Appendix) presents the 
estimates from equation (5) pre- and post-
EURONEXT which again confirm that Ⱦt is 
significant (1 percent level) in all cases with its 
values growing5 post-EURONEXT. The lagged 
volume coefficient furnishes us with an interesting 
pattern: whereas it remains insignificantly positive 
pre-EURONEXT, it turns significantly (5 percent 
level) negative post-EURONEXT, thus indicating 
that the volume-effect detected in table 8 is related 
to the market’s entry into EURONEXT. 
The results from Tables 10-15, therefore, show that 
those styles (contrarian trading; size; volume) 
appearing significant in the full sample tests (tables 
3-8) trace their significance in the period following 
Portugal’s membership into EURONEXT and this 
needs to be combined with the increase in the 
“funds following their own trades” part (and the 
decrease in the “funds following others’ trades” 
part) in Table 9 post-EURONEXT. A possible 
explanation for the above is that the EURONEXT 
environment allows for enhanced transparency and 
improved quality of information, thus reducing the 
incentive of fund managers to mimic each other in 
their trades, leading them to pursue their own 
strategies instead. If this is indeed the case – and 
                                                     
4
 The difference in the values of ȕt pre- versus post-EURONEXT is 
significant (5 percent level) for the full sample of our stocks and 
assuming stocks traded by at least three funds.  
5
 ȕt is significantly higher post-EURONEXT compared to pre-
EURONEXT for the full sample of stocks and assuming stocks traded 
by at least three funds.   
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given the popularity of style investing among fund 
managers – this would suggest that the significance 
of the style-variables would be expected to be more 
evident following Portugal’s entry into the 
EURONEXT which is what Tables 10-15 indicate. 
However, the second half of the post-EURONEXT 
period includes the ongoing financial crisis and it is, 
therefore, advisable that we control for its impact 
over our post-EURONEXT results. To that end, we 
split the post-EURONEXT period into a pre-crisis 
(September 2002-December 2007) and a post-crisis 
(January 2008-June 2011) sub-period and run first 
equation (3) for each of the two sub-periods. Results 
are presented in table 16 and show that Ⱦt remains 
significant (1 percent level) in all tests, both pre- 
and post-crisis with its values being rather similar in 
both sub-periods and with their difference before and 
after the crisis appearing insignificant. The values of 
the “funds following their own trades” part are always 
significant and consistently higher post-crisis; the 
values of the “funds following others’ trades” part are 
also always significant (1 percent level) and 
consistently lower post-crisis. It is interesting to note 
that the difference in the values of each these two parts 
pre- versus post-crisis is insignificant for all tests. 
Table 17 (see Appendix) presents the results pre- 
versus post-crisis controlling for consensus analyst 
recommendations. As the table’s estimates show, Ⱦt 
declines consistently post-crisis1 while its values are 
always significant (1 percent level). With regards to 
the analysts’ recommendation coefficient, it is 
reflective of very limited statistical significance2, thus 
confirming one more time that it does not constitute 
a style followed by Portuguese equity funds. 
Table 18 (see Appendix) provides us with the pre- 
and post-crisis estimates when accounting for the 
impact of momentum trading over institutional 
demand. According to the estimates presented, Ⱦt is 
always significant (1 percent level) and smaller in 
value post-crisis, without its pre- versus post-crisis 
difference being significant though. The lagged 
returns’ coefficient appears significantly (5 percent 
level) negative post-crisis when assuming stocks 
traded by at least three, four and five funds; its pre-
crisis significance is evident only when assuming the 
full sample of stocks (10 percent level)3. These results 
indicate that the previously documented evidence on 
the significant contrarian tendencies of Portuguese 
equity funds is heavily influenced by the crisis-period. 
                                                     
1
 The pre- versus post-crisis difference is significant when assuming 
stocks traded by at least four (10 percent level) and five (5 percent 
level) funds. 
2
 It is significant at the 10 percent level post-crisis assuming stocks 
traded by at least four and five funds, respectively. 
3
 The difference in the lagged returns’ coefficient pre- versus post-crisis 
is insignificant in all cases.  
The picture when controlling for size before and 
after the crisis is rather different. As Table 19 (see 
Appendix) shows, Ⱦt is always significant (1 percent 
level) in all tests. However, the size-coefficient 
presents us with an interesting pattern. Whereas it 
appears overwhelmingly significant (5 percent level) 
and negative pre-crisis, this significance disappears 
post-crisis4. This indicates that the previously 
documented size-effect in the post-EURONEXT 
period is the result of the first half of that period and 
ceases to exist in the crisis-years. Ⱦt maintains its significance (1 percent level) both 
pre- and post-crisis when controlling for P/E as a 
proxy for value/growth strategies. As Table 20 (see 
Appendix) illustrates, its value declines post-crisis 
without however the pre- versus post-crisis 
difference being significant in any case. The lagged 
P/E-coefficient appears consistently insignificant in 
all tests, thus confirming that Portuguese equity 
funds do not engage in value/growth trading. 
A similar picture emerges when controlling for 
volatility in Table 21 (see Appendix), with Ⱦt 
remaining always significant (1 percent level) in all 
tests. The lagged volatility coefficient is almost 
uniformly insignificant, again suggesting that 
volatility does not constitute a key style-choice for 
our sample funds.  
When volume is accounted for as a style, the 
significance (1 percent level) of ȕt persists (Table 22) 
(see Appendix). With regards to the lagged volume 
coefficient, it appears uniformly significantly negative 
pre-crisis, only to see this significance evaporating 
post-crisis. This implies that the above mentioned 
volume-effect in the post-EURONEXT period is 
mainly the result of the first half of this period, with 
the outbreak of the financial crisis leading to its 
dissipation. 
The results from Tables 17-22 confirm that the 
styles tested for and found insignificant in the full-
sample tests (Tables 3-8) and the pre- versus post-
EURONEXT tests (Tables 10-15), namely those 
based on consensus analysts’ recommendations, 
value/growth and volatility continue to present 
themselves significantly when the financial crisis is 
accounted for. Two of the styles (size; volume) found 
significant post-EURONEXT were in fact affected by 
the crisis, since their significance was detected in the 
pre- yet not in the post-crisis period. Conversely, the 
established contrarian trading of Portuguese domestic 
funds for the post-EURONEXT period seems to be 
rather due to the crisis itself, as no evidence of its 
significance was found before the crisis’ outbreak.  
                                                     
4
 The only evidence of some significance post-crisis is at the 10 percent 
level assuming stocks traded by at least three funds.  
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Summarizing our results, we can state that the 
demand of Portuguese equity funds for their 
domestic stocks exhibits significance in its 
temporal dependence in all tests we conducted 
with herding being the key driver of this 
dependence. Controlling for a series of styles, we 
identified some patterns of insignificance for 
some and significance for others. To begin with, 
Portuguese institutional investors do not appear to 
engage significantly in style-investing on the 
premises of consensus analysts’ recommendations, 
value/growth or volatility. On the contrary, there 
seems to be evidence in support of their demand 
being an inverse function of past month’s 
performance, thus suggesting that Portuguese fund 
managers are contrarian traders (buying recent 
losers and selling recent winners) and indicates a 
stabilizing impact on their behalf. Furthermore, 
institutional demand here is found to bear an inverse 
relationship with both market capitalization and 
volume, which suggests that funds increase their 
demand as we move to stocks of relatively lower 
size and trading interest. Using the definition of 
“demand” in the Sias (2004) framework which is 
proxied through the fraction of funds buying into a 
stock, this suggests that funds exhibit greater 
convergence in their trades when buying stocks of 
relatively lower size and volume. A possible reason 
for this is that these stocks are likely to be followed 
and traded by less funds, with this reduced 
following rendering it easier for the few funds 
trading such stocks to monitor – and herd on – each 
other. What is more, the fact that these stocks are small 
and less followed renders them further prone to greater 
informational uncertainty, thus leading those funds 
active in them to resort to herding as a means towards 
tackling this informational predicament.  
Conclusion 
The present study examines for the first time the 
effect of style investing over institutional herding in 
a highly concentrated market setting. Using the 
empirical design proposed by Sias (2004) which 
views herding as a determinant of the temporal 
dependence of funds’ demand, we investigate the 
presence of this effect in the context of the 
Portuguese market for the July 1996-June 2011 
period on the premises of monthly portfolio-
statements of Portuguese equity funds.  
Our results indicate that the persistence of institutional 
demand over time always appears highly statistically 
significant and is, for the most part, driven by 
Portuguese funds’ tendency to mimic each other (i.e. 
herding). Controlling for the impact of six distinctive 
 
styles (consensus analysts’ recom-mendations; 
momentum; size; value-growth; volatility; volume) 
over our estimations, we notice that some styles 
exhibit no significance in their presence whatsoever 
(consensus analysts’ recommendations; value-growth; 
volatility), while others reveal specific patterns in the 
trading conduct of Portuguese funds. More 
specifically, the latter are found to be significant 
contrarian traders (buying past month’s losers; selling 
past month’s winners) and tend to exhibit greater 
persistence in their demand when trading stocks of 
relatively low size and volume. It is interesting to note 
here that controlling for style-investing produces no 
effect over the persistence of institutional demand 
which remains significant in all tests.  
Controlling for the impact of EURONEXT-
membership over our results shows that the styles 
appearing significant for the full-sample tests 
(contrarianism; size; volume) maintain their 
significance only in the period following Portugal’s 
merger into EURONEXT. A possible explanation for 
this is that EURONEXT’s environment allows for 
enhanced transparency and improved quality of 
information, thus reducing the incentive of fund 
managers to mimic each other in their trades, leading 
them to pursue their own strategies instead. 
However, these post-EURONEXT findings do not 
appear robust to the impact of the ongoing credit 
crisis when splitting the post-EURONEXT period 
into pre- and post-crisis. The styles based on size 
and volume originally found to be significant post-
EURONEXT were in fact affected by the crisis, 
since their significance was detected in the pre- yet not 
in the post-crisis period. Conversely, the established 
contrarian trading of Portuguese domestic funds for 
the post-EURONEXT period seems to be due to the 
crisis itself, as no evidence of its significance was 
found before the crisis’ outbreak. It is interesting to 
note here that the persistence of institutional demand 
remains significant in all of the above tests without a 
single exception. 
The overall picture stemming from our results is that 
the persistence of institutional demand over time in 
Portugal is mostly due to herding and the 
significance of this persistence does not disappear, 
irrespective of the style accounted for or the time-
period involved. It is further obvious from our 
findings that the significance of style in Portuguese 
funds’ trading is limited and sensitive to the period 
tested for. All in all, the above indicate that style-
investing does not constitute a consistent practice in 
highly concentrated markets, whilst also bearing no 
effect over the significance of the observed herding 
among fund managers in such environments.  
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Appendix 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
No. of stocks 99 
No. of funds 65 
No. of stock-holdings positions 129276 
No. of stock-months 6767 
Average No. of 
active stocks per 
month traded by 
Aug `96-
Jun `11 
`96 
(Aug-
Dec) 
`97 `98 `99 `00 `01 `02 `03 `04 `05 `06 `06 `08 `09 `10 
`11 
(Jan-
Jun) 
 1 fund 37.8 49.2 52.0 54.8 51.8 43.8 35.3 30.7 26.9 28.5 32.4 33.8 32.9 34.8 35.2 34.3 32.5 
 2 funds 34.3 44.2 47.5 49.0 47.1 38.3 29.5 25.7 23.1 25.5 29.6 32.4 32.1 33.3 33.2 31.8 30.8 
 3 funds 31.2 39.6 43.6 44.8 42.2 35.1 26.5 23.5 20.5 22.3 26.3 30.4 29.7 31.2 30.8 29.0 25.8 
 4 funds 28.7 34.6 40.0 41.8 39.1 32.3 24.3 21.7 18.5 20.5 23.7 27.8 26.8 29.8 29.1 26.7 24.7 
 5 funds 26.4 31.6 37.2 39.6 37.1 30.1 21.3 19.4 15.7 18.2 21.2 25.4 25.4 27.7 26.3 24.5 22.0 
Average No. of 
active funds per 
stock per month 
Aug `96-
Jun `11 
`96 
(Aug-
Dec) 
`97 `98 `99 `00 `01 `02 `03 `04 `05 `06 `07 `08 `09 `10 
`11 
(Jan-
Jun) 
 1 fund 7.7 7.7 9.3 10.3 10.4 9.7 7.6 7 4.4 8.3 5.9 6.6 7.0 7.3 6.9 7.9 7.5 
 2 funds 8.2 8.0 9.5 11 10.7 10.2 8.6 7.8 5.2 9.1 5.8 7.1 7.2 7.6 7.0 8.0 7.5 
 3 funds 8.7 8.2 9.7 11.8 12 10.4 9.1 9 6.2 9.3 6.3 7.0 7.4 7.9 7.6 8.3 8.4 
 4 funds 8.9 8.9 10.2 12.9 12 10.8 9.4 9.1 6.4 9.0 6.6 7.4 7.6 8.0 7.7 8.3 8.6 
 5 funds 9.2 9.5 11.0 13.4 12.3 10.9 10.5 9.1 6.8 9.2 6.7 7.2 7.5 7.8 7.6 8.6 8.8 
Table 2. Test for herding 
Average coefficient (ȕ) Partitioned slope coefficient Average R2 
Funds following their own trades Funds following others' trades 
Stocks traded by  1 fund 
0.3307 
(20.44)*** 
0.1037 
(9.76)***
0.227 
(16.87)***
0.1537 
Stocks traded by  2 funds 
0.3396 
(19.50)*** 
0.0907 
(9.04)***
0.2489 
(16.10)***
0.1631 
Stocks traded by  3 funds 
0.3417 
20.32)*** 
0.1149 
(8.59)***
0.2268 
(13.10)***
0.1642 
Stocks traded by  4 funds 
0.3339 
(18.70)*** 
0.1255 
(8.74)***
0.2085 
(10.88)***
0.162 
Stocks traded by  5 funds 
0.344 
(18.21)*** 
0.1267 
(8.31)***
0.2173 
(10.66)***
0.181 
Notes: The table presents the results from equation (1): 
tktkttk ,1,, HE ' '  . * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level, and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Table 3. Analysts’ recommendations 
Average coefficient (ȕ1) Analysts’ recommendations coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2  
Stocks traded by  1 fund 
0.3134 
(17.27)*** 
0.0011 
(0.07) 
0.1924 
Stocks traded by  2 funds 
0.3276 
(17.90)*** 
-0.0078  
(-0.48) 
0.2015 
Stocks traded by  3 funds 
0.3240 
(17.91)*** 
-0.0142 
(-0.76) 
0.2076 
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Table 3 (cont.). Analysts’ recommendations 
Average coefficient (ȕ1) Analysts’ recommendations coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2  
Stocks traded by  4 funds 
0.3120 
(15.42)*** 
-0.0139 
(-0.68) 
0.2173 
Stocks traded by  5 funds 
0.3188 
(14.87)*** 
-0.0150 
(-0.68) 
0.2374 
Notes: The table presents the results from equation (3): ,
,1,21,, tktktkttk X HEE ' '   where Xk,t-1 the variable controlling for the 
recommendations of analysts. * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. 
Table 4. Momentum 
Average coefficient (ȕ1) Momentum coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2  
Stocks traded by  1 fund 
0.3483 
(20.28)*** 
-0.0210 
(-1.37) 
0.1968 
Stocks traded by  2 funds 
0.3478  
(19.78)*** 
-0.0248 
(-1.54) 
0.2026 
Stocks traded by  3 funds 
0.3460 
(19.79)*** 
-0.0366  
(-2.14)** 
0.2030 
Stocks traded by  4 funds 
0.3341 
(18.18)*** 
-0.0443 
(-2.55)** 
0.2090 
Stocks traded by  5 funds 
0.3492 
(17.65)*** 
-0.0364 
 (-2.11)** 
0.2278 
Notes: The table presents the results from equation (3): ,
,1,21,, tktktkttk X HEE ' '   where Xl,t-1 the variable controlling for the past 
returns. * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Table 5. Market value 
Average coefficient (ȕ1) Market value coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2  
Stocks traded by  1 fund 
0.3452 
(20.39)*** 
-0.1748 
(-2.68)** 
0.1857 
Stocks traded by  2 funds 
0.3507 
(20.00)*** 
-0.1852 
(-2.61)** 
0.1950 
Stocks traded by  3 funds 
0.3498 
(20.29)*** 
-0.2212 
(-2.68)** 
0.2020 
Stocks traded by  4 funds 
0.3410 
(18.56)*** 
-0.1759 
(-1.89)* 
0.2096 
Stocks traded by  5 funds 
0.3543 
(18.48)*** 
-0.1602 
(-1.61) 
0.2297 
Notes: The table presents the results from equation (3): ,
,1,21,, tktktkttk X HEE ' '   where Xl,t-1 the variable controlling for the 
market value. * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at 
the 1% level. 
Table 6. Value strategies 
Average coefficient (ȕ1) P/E coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2  
Stocks traded by  1 fund 
0.3479 
(20.18)*** 
-0.0001 
(0.00) 
0.2018 
Stocks traded by  2 funds 
0.3524 
(19.88)*** 
-0.0068 
(-0.33) 
0.2077 
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Table 6 (cont.). Value strategies 
Average coefficient (ȕ1) P/E coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2  
Stocks traded by  3 funds 
0.3487  
(19.18)*** 
-0.0064  
(-0.26) 
0.2168 
Stocks traded by  4 funds 
0.3328 
(16.90)*** 
0.0067 
(0.28) 
0.2191 
Stocks traded by  5 funds 
0.3409 
(16.29)*** 
0.0175 
 (0.73) 
0.2342 
Notes: The table presents the results from equation (3): ,
,1,21,, tktktkttk X HEE ' '   where Xl,t-1 the variable controlling for the 
P/E ratio. * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Table 7. Volatility 
Average coefficient (ȕ1) Volatility coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2  
Stocks traded by  1 fund 
0.3470 
(19.98)*** 
0.0057  
(0.26) 
0.1935 
Stocks traded by  2 funds 
0.3426  
(20.06)*** 
-0.0017 
(0.08) 
0.1983 
Stocks traded by  3 funds 
0.3502 
(21.36)*** 
0.0019 
(0.08) 
0.2013 
Stocks traded by  4 funds 
0.3323 
(18.05)*** 
0.0367 
 (1.44) 
0.2102 
Stocks traded by  5 funds 
0.3490 
(17.90)*** 
0.0316 
(1.12) 
0.2322 
Notes: The table presents the results from equation (3): ,
,1,21,, tktktkttk X HEE ' '   where Xl,t-1 the variable controlling for the 
volatility. * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Table 8. Volume 
Average coefficient (ȕ1) Volume coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2  
Stocks traded by  1 fund 
0.3374 
(19.50)*** 
-0.0222 
(-2.30)** 
0.1913 
Stocks traded by  2 funds 
0.3492  
(19.18)*** 
-0.0200 
 (-1.99)** 
0.2026 
Stocks traded by  3 funds 
0.3533 
(19.99)*** 
-0.0185 
 (-1.80)* 
0.2093 
Stocks traded by  4 funds 
0.3430 
(17.95)*** 
-0.0181 
 (-1.71)* 
0.2176 
Stocks traded by  5 funds 
0.3581 
(17.90)*** 
-0.0118 
(-1.15) 
0.2342 
Notes: The table presents the results from equation (3): ,
,1,21,, tktktkttk X HEE ' '   where Xl,t-1 the variable controlling for the 
volume. * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Table 9. Herding pre- and post-EURONEXT 
Average coefficient (ȕ) Partitioned slope coefficient Average R2 
Funds following their own trades Funds following others’ trades 
Pre-
EURONEXT 
Post-
EURONEXT 
t test 
Pre-
EURONEXT 
Post-
EURONEXT 
t test 
Pre-
EURONEXT 
Post-
EURONEXT 
t test 
Pre-
EURONEXT 
Post- 
EURONEXT 
Stocks traded by  1 fund 
0.2806 
(12.98)*** 
0.3647 
(16.33)*** 
(-2.71)** 
0.0694 
(5.74)*** 
0.1269 
(8.20)*** 
(-2.93)** 
0.2112 
(10.41)*** 
0.2378 
(13.27)*** 
(-0.98) 0.1089 0.1842 
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Table 9 (cont.). Herding pre- and post-EURONEXT 
Average coefficient (ȕ) Partitioned slope coefficient Average R2 
Funds following their own trades Funds following others’ trades 
Pre-
EURONEXT 
Post-
EURONEXT 
t test 
Pre-
EURONEXT 
Post-
EURONEXT 
t test 
Pre-
EURONEXT 
Post-
EURONEXT 
t test 
Pre-
EURONEXT 
Post- 
EURONEXT 
Stocks traded by  2 funds 
0.3129 
(13.61)*** 
0.3588 
(14.68)*** 
(-1.33) 
0.0541 
(5.47)*** 
0.1156 
(7.77)*** 
(-3.42)*** 
0.2588 
(10.75)*** 
0.2422 
(11.97)*** 
(-0.53) 0.1293 0.1861 
Stocks traded by  3 funds 
0.3072 
(13.65)*** 
0.3652 
(15.50)*** 
(-1.78)* 
0.0731 
(4.66)*** 
0.1433 
(7.41)*** 
(-2.82)** 
0.2341 
(8.31)*** 
0.2219 
(10.09)*** 
(-0.34) 0.1282 0.1886 
Stocks traded by  4 funds 
0.3231 
(14.19)*** 
0.3413 
(13.25)*** 
(-0.53) 
0.0813 
(4.99)*** 
0.1555 
(7.41)*** 
(-2.79)** 
0.2418 
(8.49)*** 
0.1858 
(7.26)*** 
(1.46) 0.1290 0.1844 
Stocks traded by  5 funds 
0.3382 
(12.79)*** 
0.3480 
(13.26)*** 
(-0.26) 
0.0788 
(4.44)*** 
0.1592 
(7.21)*** 
(-2.84)** 
0.2593 
(8.11)*** 
0.1888 
(7.20)*** 
(1.71)* 0.1545 0.199 
Notes: The table presents the results from equation (1): .
,1,, tktkttk HE ' '   * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Table 10. Analysts’ recommendations pre- and post-Euronext 
Average coefficient (ȕ) Analysts’ recommendations coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2 
Pre-EURONEXT Post-EURONEXT t test Pre-EURONEXT Post-EURONEXT t test Pre-EURONEXT Post-EURONEXT 
Stocks traded by  1 fund 
0.2870  
(12.00)*** 
0.3314 
(12.88)*** 
(-1.26) 
0.0043 
(0.20) 
-0.0010 
(-0.05) 
(0.18) 0.1504 0.2210 
Stocks traded by  2 funds 
0.3211 
(13.57)*** 
0.3321 
(12.64)*** 
(-0.31) 
-0.0046 
 (-0.21) 
-0.0099  
(-0.44) 
(0.17) 0.1644 0.2267 
Stocks traded by  3 funds 
0.3146 
(13.31)*** 
0.3303 
 (12.77)*** 
(1.97)*** 
-0.0183  
(-0.69) 
-0.0115 
(-0.44) 
(-0.18) 0.1697 0.2333 
Stocks traded by  4 funds 
0.3328  
(13.96)*** 
0.2978  
(9.96)*** 
(0.92) 
-0.0428  
(-1.53) 
0.0057 
 (0.20) 
(-1.21) 0.1796 0.2429 
Stocks traded by  5 funds 
0.3467 
(12.34)*** 
0.2998  
(9.83)*** 
(1.13) 
-0.0479 
(-1.70)* 
0.0073 
 (0.23) 
(-1.30) 0.2018 0.2615 
Notes: The table presents the results from equation (3): ,
,1,21,, tktktkttk X HEE ' '   where Xl,t-1 the variable controlling for the 
analysts’ recommendations. * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. 
Table 11. Momentum 
Average coefficient (ȕ) Momentum coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2 
Pre-EURONEXT Post-EURONEXT t test Pre-EURONEXT Post-EURONEXT t test Pre-EURONEXT Post-EURONEXT 
Stocks traded by  1 fund 
0.2925 
(12.08)*** 
0.3862 
(16.75)*** 
(-2.80)** 
0.0129 
(0.63) 
-0.0440 
(-2.06)** 
(1.92)* 0.1403 0.2352 
Stocks traded by  2 funds 
0.3160 
(13.01)*** 
0.3695 
 (15.16)*** 
(-1.55) 
-0.0016 
(-0.07) 
-0.0406 
(-1.83)* 
(1.23) 0.1588 0.2323 
Stocks traded by  3 funds 
0.3051 
(12.41)*** 
0.3737 
(15.66)*** 
(-2.00)** 
-0.0204 
(-0.79) 
-0.0476 
(-2.09)** 
(0.79) 0.1629 0.2303 
Stocks traded by  4 funds 
0.3192 
(13.16)*** 
0.3441 
(13.16)*** 
(-0.70) 
-0.0317 
(-1.16) 
-0.0529 
(-2.34)** 
(0.60) 0.1756 0.2317 
Stocks traded by  5 funds 
0.3326 
(11.54)*** 
0.3605 
(13.40)*** 
(-0.71) 
-0.0426 
(-1.54) 
-0.0322 
(-1.46) 
(-0.29) 0.2009 0.2461 
Notes: The table presents the results from equation (3): ,
,1,21,, tktktkttk X HEE ' '   where Xl,t-1 the variable controlling for the past 
returns. * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 12. Market value 
Average coefficient (ȕ) Market value coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2 
Pre-EURONEXT Post-EURONEXT t test Pre-EURONEXT Post-EURONEXT t test Pre-EURONEXT Post-EURONEXT
Stocks traded by  1 fund 
0.2872 
(11.99)*** 
0.3846  
(17.02)*** 
(-2.96)** 
-0.0105  
(-0.12) 
-0.2864 
(-3.14)*** 
(2.20)** 0.1369 0.2189 
Stocks traded by  2 funds 
0.3160  
(13.26)*** 
0.3742 
(15.32)*** 
(-1.71)* 
-0.0277 
(-0.29) 
-0.2921 
(-2.94)*** 
(1.92)* 0.1561 0.2213 
Stocks traded by  3 funds 
0.3086 
(13.18)*** 
0.3778 
(15.80)*** 
(-2.07)** 
-0.0292 
(-0.29) 
-0.3516 
(-2.95)*** 
(2.07)** 0.1562 0.2332 
Stocks traded by  4 funds 
0.3208 
(13.63)*** 
0.3546  
(13.44)*** 
(-0.96) 
-0.0079 
(-0.07) 
-0.2901 
(-2.17)** 
(1.58) 0.1663 0.2391 
Stocks traded by  5 funds 
0.3414 
(12.64)*** 
0.3631 
(13.69)*** 
(-0.57) 
0.0274 
(0.20) 
-0.2877 
(-2.07)** 
(1.62) 0.1954 0.2529 
Notes: The table presents the results from equation (3): ,
,1,21,, tktktkttk X HEE ' '   where Xl,t-1 the variable controlling for the market 
value. * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Table 13. Value/Growth strategies 
Average coefficient (ȕ) P/E coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2 
Pre-EURONEXT Post-EURONEXT t test Pre-EURONEXT Post-EURONEXT t test Pre-EURONEXT Post-EURONEXT 
Stocks traded by  1 fund 
0.2758  
(11.82)*** 
0.3969 
 (17.17)*** 
(-3.69)*** 
0.0208 
(0.87) 
-0.0142 
(-0.55) 
(0.99) 0.1424 0.2422 
Stocks traded by  2 funds 
0.2872 
(12.18)*** 
0.3966  
(16.36)*** 
(-3.24)** 
-0.0076 
(-0.25) 
-0.0063  
(-0.22) 
(-0.03) 0.1594 0.2405 
Stocks traded by  3 funds 
0.2763 
(11.75)*** 
0.3979 
(15.92)*** 
(-3.54)*** 
-0.0118 
(-0.34) 
-0.0028 
(-0.08) 
(-0.18) 0.1669 0.2507 
Stocks traded by  4 funds 
0.2854 
(11.51)*** 
0.3650 
(12.98)*** 
(-2.12)** 
0.068 
(0.18) 
0.0066 
(0.21) 
(0.00) 0.1745 0.2494 
Stocks traded by  5 funds 
0.2927 
(10.11)*** 
0.3737 
(12.97)*** 
(-1.98)** 
0.0361 
(1.01) 
0.0049 
(0.15) 
(0.65) 0.1984 0.2586 
Notes: The table presents the results from equation (3): ,
,1,21,, tktktkttk X HEE ' '   where Xl,t-1 the variable controlling for the P/E ratio. 
* Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Table 14. Volatility 
Average coefficient (ȕ) Volatility coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2 
Pre-EURONEXT Post-EURONEXT t test Pre-EURONEXT Post-EURONEXT t test Pre-EURONEXT Post-EURONEXT 
Stocks traded by  1 fund 
0.2962 
(12.22)*** 
0.3742 
(16.21)*** 
(-2.33)** 
0.0320 
(1.12) 
-0.024 
(-0.87) 
(1.41) 0.1583 0.2175 
Stocks traded by  2 funds 
0.3216 
(14.35)*** 
0.3642  
(14.68)*** 
(-1.28) 
0.0608 
(2.19)** 
-0.0318 
(-1.05) 
(2.26)** 0.1463 0.2214 
Stocks traded by  3 funds 
0.3040 
(13.56)*** 
0.3816 
(16.94)*** 
(-2.44)** 
0.0586 
(1.76)* 
-0.0366 
(-1.22) 
(2.12)** 0.1668 0.2248 
Stocks traded by  4 funds 
0.3141 
(13.85)*** 
0.3446  
(12.85)*** 
(-0.87) 
0.0329 
(0.94) 
0.0393 
(1.10) 
(-0.13) 0.1719 0.2361 
Stocks traded by  5 funds 
0.3362 
(12.90)*** 
0.3577 
(12.96)*** 
(-0.57) 
0.0157 
(0.40) 
0.0424 
(1.08) 
(-0.48) 0.2003 0.2539 
Notes: The table presents the results from equation (3): ,
,1,21,, tktktkttk X HEE ' '   where Xl,t-1 the variable controlling for the 
volatility. * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 15. Volume 
Average coefficient (ȕ) Volatility coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2 
Pre-EURONEXT Post-EURONEXT t test Pre-EURONEXT Post-EURONEXT t test Pre-EURONEXT Post-EURONEXT 
Stocks traded by  1 fund 
0.2903 
(12.29)*** 
0.3693 
(15.51)*** 
(-2.36)** 
0.0106  
(0.84) 
-0.0444 
 (-3.31)*** 
(3.00)** 0.1409 0.2255 
Stocks traded by  2 funds 
0.3183 
(13.39)*** 
0.3701 
(14.32)*** 
(-1.48) 
0.0138 
(1.13) 
-0.0429 
 (-2.99)*** 
(3.01)** 0.1564 0.2340 
Stocks traded by  3 funds 
0.3113 
(13.01)*** 
0.3818 
(15.56)*** 
(-2.06)** 
0.0128 
(1.04) 
-0.0397 
 (-2.69)*** 
(2.73)** 0.1581 0.2441 
Stocks traded by  4 funds 
0.3241 
(13.81)*** 
0.3558 
(12.77)*** 
(-0.87) 
0.0114 
(0.89) 
-0.0381 
 (-2.50)** 
(2.49)** 0.1634 0.2543 
Stocks traded by  5 funds 
0.3430 
(12.86)*** 
0.3684 
 (12.99)*** 
(-0.65) 
0.0149 
(1.24) 
-0.0300  
(-1.99)** 
(2.33)** 0.1855 0.2674 
Notes: The table presents the results from equation (3): ,
,1,21,, tktktkttk X HEE ' ' 
 
where Xl,t-1 the variable controlling for the 
volume. * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Table 16. Herding pre- and post-crisis 
Average coefficient (ȕ) Partitioned slope coefficient Average R2 
Funds following their own trades Funds following others’ trades 
Pre-crisis Post-crisis t test Pre-crisis Post-crisis t test Pre-crisis Post-crisis t test Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Stocks traded by  1 fund 
0.3672 
(12.01)*** 
0.3609 
(11.21)*** 
(1.98) 
0.1221 
(8.28)*** 
0.1343 
(4.17)*** 
(2.00) 
0.2451 
(9.72)*** 
0.2265 
(9.42)*** 
(1.98) 0.1900 0.1753 
Stocks traded by  2 funds 
0.3569  
(10.35)*** 
0.359 
(10.62)*** 
(1.98) 
0.1015 
(7.46)*** 
0.137  
(4.32)*** 
(2.00) 
0.2554 
(9.15)*** 
0.2220  
(7.82)*** 
(1.98) 0.1946 0.1732 
Stocks traded by  3 funds 
0.3629 
(10.90)*** 
0.3685 
(11.70)*** 
(1.98) 
0.126 
(6.95)*** 
0.1695 
(4.21)*** 
(2.00) 
0.2369 
(7.70)*** 
0.1990 
(6.68)*** 
(1.98) 0.1973 0.1754 
Stocks traded by  4 funds 
0.3415 
(9.80)*** 
0.341 
(8.98)*** 
(1.99) 
0.1315 
(6.30)*** 
0.1919 
(4.56)*** 
(2.00) 
0.2100 
(5.95)*** 
0.1490 
(4.20)*** 
(1.98) 0.1936 0.1703 
Stocks traded by  5 funds 
0.3531 
(9.98)*** 
0.3401  
(8.73)*** 
(1.99) 
0.1409 
(6.26)*** 
0.1870 
(4.25)*** 
(2.00) 
0.2122 
(5.77)*** 
0.1531 
(4.36)*** 
(1.98) 0.2107 0.1811 
Notes: The table presents the results from equation (1): 
.
,1,, tktkttk HE ' '   * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Table 17. Analysts’ recommendations 
Average coefficient (ȕ) Analysts’ reccomendations coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2 
Pre-crisis Post-crisis t test Pre-crisis Post-crisis t test Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Stocks traded by  1 fund 
0.3376 
(9.42)*** 
0.3218 
(9.04)*** 
(1.98) 
0.0100 
(0.34) 
-0.0178 
(-0.62) 
(1.98) 0.2396 0.1925 
Stocks traded by  2 funds 
0.3546  
(10.05)*** 
0.2978  
(7.68)*** 
(1.99) 
-0.0139 
(-0.44) 
-0.0039 
 (-0.13) 
(1.98) 0.2552 0.1831 
Stocks traded by  3 funds 
0.3616 
(10.66)*** 
0.2827 
(7.21)*** 
(1.99) 
-0.0304 
(-0.82) 
0.0175 
 (0.54) 
(1.98) 0.2669 0.1820 
Stocks traded by  4 funds 
0.3400 
(9.01)*** 
0.2335 
(4.89)*** 
(1.99)* 
-0.0301 
(-0.72) 
0.0602 
(1.81)* 
(1.98)** 0.2780 0.1893 
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Table 17 (cont.). Analysts’ recommendations 
Average coefficient (ȕ) Analysts’ reccomendations coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2 
Pre-crisis Post-crisis t test Pre-crisis Post-crisis t test Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Stocks traded by  5 funds 
0.3523 
(9.40)*** 
0.2198 
(4.43)*** 
(1.99)** 
-0.0411  
(-0.93) 
0.081 
(1.95)* 
(1.98)** 0.2997 0.2033 
Notes: The table presents the results from equation (3): ,
,1,21,, tktktkttk X HEE ' ' 
 
where Xl,t-1 the variable controlling for the 
analysts’ recommendations. * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. 
Table 18. Momentum 
Average coefficient (ȕ) Momentum coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2 
Pre-crisis Post-crisis t test Pre-crisis Post-crisis t test Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Stocks traded by  1 fund 
0.3993 
(12.33)*** 
0.3663 
(11.78)*** 
(1.98) 
-0.0567 
(-1.77)* 
-0.0247 
(-1.07) 
(1.98) 0.2536 0.2072 
Stocks traded by  2 funds 
0.3834 
(11.15)*** 
0.3482 
(10.74)*** 
(1.98) 
-0.0434 
(-1.28) 
-0.0365 
(-1.60) 
(1.98) 0.2531 0.2007 
Stocks traded by  3 funds 
0.3832  
(11.33)*** 
0.3594 
(11.40*** 
(1.98) 
-0.0457 
(-1.29) 
-0.0504 
(-2.43)** 
(1.98) 0.2447 0.2083 
Stocks traded by  4 funds 
0.3523 
(9.83)*** 
0.3318 
(8.85)*** 
(1.98) 
-0.0423  
(-1.29) 
-0.0690  
(-2.46)** 
(1.98) 0.2424 0.2154 
Stocks traded by  5 funds 
0.3763 
(10.37)*** 
0.3363 
(8.49)*** 
(1.99) 
-0.0081 
(-0.25) 
-0.0690 
(-2.54)** 
(1.98) 0.2592 0.2261 
Notes: The table presents the results from equation (3): ,
,1,21,, tktktkttk X HEE ' ' 
 
where Xl,t-1 the variable controlling for the 
past returns. * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 
1% level. 
Table 19. Market value 
Average coefficient (ȕ) Market value coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2 
Pre-crisis Post-crisis t test Pre-crisis Post-crisis t test Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Stocks traded by  1 fund 
0.3870 
(12.25)*** 
0.3810 
(12.26)*** 
(1.98) 
-0.3776  
(-3.11)*** 
-0.1475 
(-1.08) 
(1.99) 0.2284 0.2043 
Stocks traded by  2 funds 
0.3793 
(11.14)*** 
0.3664 
(10.86)*** 
(1.98) 
-0.3928 
(-2.88)*** 
-0.1386  
(-1.00) 
(1.98) 0.2363 0.1985 
Stocks traded by  3 funds 
0.3757 
(11.18)*** 
0.3809 
(11.77)*** 
(1.98) 
-0.3822 
(-2.38)** 
-0.3051 
(-1.72)* 
(1.99) 0.2426 0.2189 
Stocks traded by  4 funds 
0.3527 
(9.76)*** 
0.3577  
(9.41)*** 
(1.98) 
-0.3513  
(-1.87)* 
-0.1968 
(-1.10) 
(1.98) 0.2515 0.2203 
Stocks traded by  5 funds 
0.3667 
(10.29)*** 
0.3577  
(9.02)*** 
(1.99) 
-0.3558  
(-1.83)* 
-0.1838 
(-0.97) 
(1.98) 0.2679 0.2302 
Notes: The table presents the results from equation (3): ,
,1,21,, tktktkttk X HEE ' ' 
 
where Xl,t-1 the variable controlling for the 
market value. * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at 
the 1% level. 
Table 20. Value/Growth strategies 
Average coefficient (ȕ) P/E coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2  
Pre-crisis Post-crisis t test Pre-crisis Post-crisis t test Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Stocks traded by  1 fund 
0.3987 
(12.44)*** 
0.3941 
(12.16)*** 
(1.98) 
0.0069 
(0.19) 
-0.0464 
(-1.33) 
(1.98) 0.2523 0.2268 
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Table 20 (cont.). Value/Growth strategies 
Average coefficient (ȕ) P/E coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2  
Pre-crisis Post-crisis t test Pre-crisis Post-crisis t test Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Stocks traded by  2 funds 
0.3995  
(12.08)*** 
0.3922 
(11.14)*** 
(1.98) 
0.0125  
(0.31) 
-0.0350  
(-0.95) 
(1.98) 0.2546 0.2191 
Stocks traded by  3 funds 
0.4008 
(11.69)*** 
0.3936 
(10.99)*** 
(1.98) 
-0.0100 
(-0.20) 
0.0081 
(0.20) 
(1.98) 0.2679 0.2246 
Stocks traded by  4 funds 
0.3710 
(9.74)*** 
0.3557  
(8.61)*** 
(1.99) 
0.0025 
(0.05) 
0.0129 
(0.34) 
(1.98) 0.2687 0.2198 
Stocks traded by  5 funds 
0.3870 
(10.27)*** 
0.3533 
(7.86)*** 
(1.99) 
-0.0105 
(-0.22) 
0.0284 
(0.71) 
(1.98) 0.2774 0.2299 
Notes: The table presents the results from equation (3): ,
,1,21,, tktktkttk X HEE ' ' 
 
where Xl,t-1 the variable controlling for the P/E 
ratio. * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Table 21. Volatility 
Average coefficient (ȕ) Volatility coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2  
Pre-crisis Post-crisis t test Pre-crisis Post-crisis t test Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Stocks traded by  1 fund 
0.3732 
(11.50)*** 
0.3756 
(12.00)*** 
(1.98) 
-0.0308 
(-0.89) 
-0.0149 
(-0.31) 
(1.99) 0.2233 0.2086 
Stocks traded by  2 funds 
0.3706 
(10.95)*** 
0.3545  
(9.86)*** 
(1.98) 
-0.0649 
(-1.79)* 
0.0187 
(0.36) 
(1.99) 0.2308 0.2071 
Stocks traded by  3 funds 
0.3855 
(12.30)*** 
0.3756 
(12.00)*** 
(1.98) 
-0.0508 
(-1.32) 
-0.0149  
(-0.31) 
(1.99) 0.2354 0.2086 
Stocks traded by  4 funds 
0.3405  
(9.45)*** 
0.3508 
(8.76)*** 
(1.99) 
0.0227 
 (0.50) 
0.0647 
(1.09) 
(1.99) 0.2451 0.2225 
Stocks traded by  5 funds 
0.3602 
(10.00)*** 
0.3540 
(8.15)*** 
(1.99) 
0.0117 
(0.23) 
0.0891 
(1.43) 
(1.99) 0.2702 0.2291 
Notes: The table presents the results from equation (3): ,
,1,21,, tktktkttk X HEE ' ' 
 
where Xl,t-1 the variable controlling for the 
volatility. * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Table 22. Volume 
Average coefficient (ȕ) Volume coefficient (ȕ2) Average R2  
Pre-crisis Post-crisis t test Pre-crisis Post-crisis t test Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Stocks traded by  1 fund 
0.3611 
(10.79)*** 
0.3819 
(11.87)*** 
(1.98) 
-0.0748 
(-4.14)*** 
0.0019 
(0.11) 
(1.98)** 0.2432 0.1985 
Stocks traded by  2 funds 
0.3706 
(10.33)*** 
0.3695 
(10.23)*** 
(1.98) 
-0.0719  
(-3.64)*** 
0.0013 
(0.07) 
(1.98)** 0.2588 0.1961 
Stocks traded by  3 funds 
0.3743 
(10.95)*** 
0.3931 
(11.59)*** 
(1.98) 
-0.0635 
(-3.14)*** 
-0.0033 
(-0.17) 
(1.98)** 0.2680 0.2077 
Stocks traded by  4 funds 
0.3467 
(9.20)*** 
0.3697 
(9.01)*** 
(1.99) 
-0.0631 
(-3.03)*** 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
(1.98)** 0.2785 0.2175 
Stocks traded by  5 funds 
0.3657 
(9.64)*** 
0.3725 
(8.73)*** 
(1.99) 
-0.0528 
(-2.60)** 
0.0048 
(0.23) 
(1.98)* 0.2943 0.2263 
Notes: The table presents the results from equation (3): ,
,1,21,, tktktkttk X HEE ' ' 
 
where Xl,t-1 the variable controlling for the 
volume. * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
